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Abstract
Given the difficulty of fully securing complex cyber
systems, there is growing interest in making cyber systems resilient to the cyber threat. However, quantifying the resilience of a system in an organizationallyrelevant manner remains a challenge. This paper describes initial research into a novel metric for quantifying the resilience of a system to cyber threats called
the Resilience Index (RI). We calculate the RI via an
effects-based discrete event stochastic simulation that
runs a large number of trials over a designated mission timeline. During the trials, adverse cyber events
(ACEs) occur against cyber assets in a target system.
We consider a trial a failure if an ACE causes the performance of any of the target system’s mission essential functions (MEFs) to fall below its assigned threshold level. Once all trials have completed, the simulator
computes the ratio of successful trials to the total number of trials, yielding RI. The linkage of ACEs to MEFs
provides the organizational tie.

1. Introduction
There is increasing recognition that cyber systems
can likely never be made fully secure [1]. A host of
root causes contribute to this situation, including high
system complexity, interconnectedness, and use of
low-assurance components. The desire for missions
and business functions that depend on such systems to
succeed despite imperfect security gives rise to the
idea of cyber resilience. For this paper, our working
definition for cyber resilience is the ability of a cyber
system to support organizational objectives by providing an acceptable level of performance for its mission
essential functions (MEFs) in spite of adverse cyber
events (ACEs). By MEFs, we mean that subset of a
cyber system’s use cases [2] that most directly support
organizational functions and mission objectives. By
ACEs, we refer to breaches of data integrity, confidentiality, or availability that could occur in a number of
ways, such as a malicious cyber attack or physical attack on cyber assets, component failure, operator error, software or hardware bugs, and acts of God.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we discuss related work and identify gaps,
including a resilience quantification gap. Next, we describe the paper’s contribution relative to the gaps, the
Resilience Index (RI) metric and a simulator that computes RI for target systems, and we present an example
run of an instantiation of the simulator. Finally, we discuss limitations and future work areas.

2. Related Work
2.1. Definitions
In addition to our working definition, the term
cyber resilience has many other definitions. For example, NIST 800-160 [3] defines resilience as: “The ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to
adverse conditions, stresses, attacks, or compromises
on systems that use or are enabled by cyber resources
regardless of the source.” CNSSI 4009 [4] defines the
term as, “The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from
disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents,
or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” Björck, et
al. [5] define the term more succinctly as: “The ability
to continuously deliver the intended outcome despite
adverse cyber events.” Our working definition is similar to these definitions; however, we specifically
highlight MEFs, as MEFs are our connection from
ACEs in a cyber system to organization/mission relevance of those ACEs.

2.2. Frameworks and Mechanisms.
A number of resilience-related cyber frameworks
have emerged in recent years. For example, volume 2
of NIST Special Publication 800-160, “Systems Security Engineering Cyber Resiliency Considerations for
the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems” [3]
lays out a set of resilience goals (Anticipate, Withstand, Recover, Adapt), more specific objectives (e.g.,
Prepare, Continue, Constrain), and techniques and approaches (e.g., Deception, Diversity, Redundancy).
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NIST’s “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity” [6] introduces the notions of
“Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover” as a
means to categorize resilience mechanisms. The Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute created the CERT Resilience Management Model
[7], which states “By improving operational resilience
processes …, an organization can use the model to improve and sustain the resilience of mission-critical assets and services.” Linkov, et al. [8] describe a cyber
resilience matrix that includes a number of resiliencerelated practices. The US Department of Defense Cybersecurity Survivability Endorsement [9] defines a
set of cyber survivability attributes arranged into Prevent, Mitigate, and Recover pillars. While such frameworks are helpful in structuring our thinking about resilience, they do not propose analytical techniques for
measuring overall resilience, nor do they offer analytics that recommend the best combination of resilience
mechanisms. In addition to organizing frameworks,
other researchers focus on specific resilience mechanisms (e.g. [10]–[12]) or on resilience in narrower domains, such as cyber-physical control systems [13].

2.3. Quantification
While quantification of resilience in other fields
(e.g., ecology [14], mechanical engineering [15]) is
more mature, the study of cyber resilience quantification is in a nascent state. Linkov and Kott [16] hint at
resilience quantification as follows, “Assuming two
equally performing systems A and B subjected to an
impact …that left both systems with an equal performance degradation, the resiliency of system A is
greater if after a given period T it recovers to a higher
level of performance than that of system B.” For these
authors, time to recover is the critical resilience quantity. The report “Partnering for Cyber Resilience” [17]
suggests that use of Monte Carlo modeling could provide a useful basis for quantifying resilience. In fact,
our inspiration for RI came both from this report and
the analogy of retirement calculators that take such an
approach for estimating the success rate of a person's
retirement plans (e.g., Vanguard [18] and
retirementsimulation.com [19]). Many variables (e.g.,
inflation rate, market return, taxation rate, funding of
Social Security, sequence of returns, longevity), contribute to the uncertainty of whether a person will have
sufficient funds throughout retirement. The Monte
Carlo approach treats these quantities as random variables with associated distributions. Through a run of,
for example, 10,000 simulation trials, such calculators
randomly sample the distributions of these variables in
a time-based simulation to compute an overall success
rate score.

2.4. Risk and Resilience
Linkov et al. [8] recognize the relationship between cyber resilience and risk, “resilient systems
should utilize generalizable concepts distinct from but
complementary to risk assessment.” In the case of malicious attack, we hypothesize a link between risk and
resilience in the sense that high risk portions of a system as measured by their mission criticality and unmitigated exposure to anticipated threats should receive attention when considering cyber resilience
mechanisms, as these are likely to be the most attractive to attackers.
There are many cyber risk frameworks and approaches in use today, such as NIST 800-30 [20], OCTAVE [21], and INFOSEC Institute's "Quantitative
Risk Analysis" method [22]. The RI simulator discussed in this paper leverages a risk approach called
BluGen [23] in order to provide risk quantification. In
BluGen, the risk, r(a), of a cyber asset, a, is a function
of the asset’s exposure, e, and criticality, c, as shown
in equation (1). Briefly, asset exposure is the ratio of
the number of unmitigated threat capabilities mapped
to an asset of a given type to the total number of applicable threat capabilities. Asset criticality is a measure
of an asset’s importance to the MEFs it supports.
𝑟(𝑎) = 1.0 −

√(𝑒(𝑎) − 1.0)2 − (𝑐(𝑎) − 1.0)2
√2

(1)

The numerator of the second term in Equation (1)
is the distance formula from an asset plotted in an x-y
plane by its exposure and criticality scores to the point
of highest risk, (1.0, 1.0), such as in a BluGen risk scatterplot. We divide by √2 to scale to the range 0.0 to
1.0, and we subtract the resulting quantity from 1.0 so
that risk rises as we approach (1.0, 1.0). BluGen provides “credit” for those mitigations added to the system description that apply to previously unmitigated
threat capabilities that affect assets in the system. The
effect is to lower the exposure score for relevant assets,
because the numerator of the ratio mentioned above is
reduced as relevant mitigations are added.

3. Research Gaps and Contribution
Despite the work in cyber resilience as summarized in the related work section, several research gaps
remain: (1) a quantitative measure of overall resilience
of a cyber system as it relates to the MEFs that a system provides is lacking; (2) the optimal level of coordination between mission-level resilience (“can we accomplish mission/business functions”) and cyberlevel resilience (“can we keep the system up”) is unexplored; (3) the most effective balance of automated
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vs. manual responses to ACEs is unknown; and (4) objective guidance on how to combine resilience mechanisms into a resulting architecture that provides a
given measure of resilience is deficient.
The contribution of this paper is an approach called
the “Resilience Index” (RI) for estimating the resilience of a cyber-intensive system to ACEs. The primary focus of RI is the first gap listed above. The organizational relevance is RI’s tie to the MEFs of a target system, which in turn support higher level organizational objectives (Figure 1).

Figure 3 illustrates how ACEs indirectly impact
MEFs by affecting the data processed by system assets
that ultimately affect MEF performance. By asset we
mean a software or hardware component, or a system
role played by a person. In the example, Asset 1 processes Data 1 in support of MEF2. If an ACE disrupts
the integrity of Data 1 on Asset 1, MEF2 will be impacted.

Figure 3. ACE-to-MEF relationship

Figure 1. Organizational use of a cyber system
An example of Figure 1 is a satellite ground system
shown in Figure 2. Section 6 below uses the example.

Figure 4 illustrates the essence of cyber resilience.
A given MEF can be impacted by one or more ACEs
over a period of time. If the system is sufficiently resilient, MEF performance can be sustained to an acceptable level despite the ACE. The figure shows a
system operating near its objective performance that
encounters an ACE. Performance may degrade below
the threshold for a time. The system or its operators
may mount an active response to the detected ACE in
order to reconstitute the system and recover the performance of the impacted MEF to an acceptable level
of performance in a mission-relevant timeframe.

Figure 2. Space situational awareness example
Here, the higher-level mission is “space situational
awareness (SSA)” with supporting ground system
MEFs to (1) make observations and (2) facilitate SSA
communications among ground parties. Each MEF, in
turn, has an acceptable range of performance determined from organizational use of the system. (We note
that some MEFs may have multiple associated metrics, or measures of effectiveness, but for simplicity,
this paper assumes one metric per MEF.) MEF values
are often expressed by threshold (minimally acceptable) and an objective (desired) values. Table 1 shows
sample values for the SSA Mission MEFs (opm = observations per minute, mbps = megabits per second).
Table 1: Acceptable MEF value ranges
MEF
Make Observations
Support Comms

MEF Values
Threshold
Objective
10 opm
15 opm
25 mbps
75 mbps

Figure 4. A cyber resilience illustration
This brings us to the meaning of the RI value,
which, as discussed below, is the percentage of simulation trials in which none of the target system’s MEF
performance values dropped below their threshold values in spite of ACEs occurring during the trials.

4. Approach
We structured our creation and examination of RI
in the context of Design Science Research (DSR) [24].
In addition to the RI metric itself, other DSR artifacts
are the RI model and method, as summarized in the
high-level architecture shown in Figure 5, and an initial instantiation of the model and method.
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Figure 5. RI simulator inputs and outputs
We came to our overall approach by noting that
there is considerable uncertainty with respect to the
number, type, timing, and targeting of ACEs. Given
the uncertainty, we constructed an effects-based discrete event stochastic simulation that treats such quantities as random variables. Unlike analogous approaches, such as retirement calculators, where decades of historical data are available to inform the random variable distributions, certain ACE-related variable distributions are not as readily available. We nonetheless designed our approach to accommodate such
data as it becomes available. Meanwhile, in order to
make initial progress, we employ uniform distributions for two variables. In other cases, we seek user
input to supply values in “what if” scenarios.
Figure 6 provides an overview of a given run of
the simulation. The idea is to execute n simulations or
trials (Tr1, Tr2, …, Trn) during an overall run, where n
is a configurable value large enough (e.g., 1,000) to
provide reasonable coverage of value ranges of relevant variables. Each trial is in the context of an overall
timeline, measured in discrete increments over an interval [1, m], where the user enters the end time, m.

As described below, we model an ACE with respect to the effect it has on a particular asset in the target system and data processed by the asset. By effectsbased, we mean that we focus on the effect the ACEs
have rather than on the multitude of ways that any
given type of ACE could come about. For example, in
the case of a malicious ACE, many potential attack
vectors and paths to a target asset and data may exist,
with numerous potential vulnerabilities to exploit
along the way, and possibly many different exploitation techniques available for use. We abstract this
complexity away by focusing on the effects.
ACEs may or may not cause a failure of an overall
trial. We define a failed trial as one in which the impact
of an ACE that takes place during the trial exceeds the
maximum allowed impact value for the MEF affected
by the ACE. The yellow starbursts in Figure 6 indicate
ACEs whose effects exceed the maximum impact allowable for the associated MEF, causing MEF performance to drop below its corresponding threshold value
for some defined period of time. The result is a failed
trial. We consider all other trials as successes. We define the RI for a system as the ratio of successful trials
to the total number of trials, per equation (2).
𝑅𝐼(𝑠) =

𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠(𝑠)
(2)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠(𝑠)

4.1. Simulation Method
Figure 7 summarizes the main simulation method.
After identifying key variables in the simulation, we
describe the steps in the simulation method in the sections following the figure.

Figure 6. Simulation overview
The cyber system under study is considered to be
operational and supporting higher level mission / business function via its MEFs during this time interval.
The time units can be whatever is convenient to the
organizational / mission context (e.g., seconds,
minutes, hours, days). Each trial takes place over a sub
interval, [i, j], of the total timeline, [1, m], with 1 ≤ i ≤
j ≤ m. During a trial, a number of ACEs take place,
represented by red dots in Figure 6. The blue squares
represent responses to ACEs.

Figure 7. Simulation method (algorithm)
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The variables shown in Table 2 govern the simulation. We treat some as random variables, while others
that currently depend on user entry (e.g., ACE detection probabilities) may be converted to random variables in the future as suitable distributions become
available based on accumulated empirical data. The
sections below discuss the variables in more detail.
The simulation method begins by generating a list
of ACEs to execute during the trials of the simulation
runs (line 1 in Figure 7). The simulator formulates
ACEs based on a set of “criticality” tuples that are input to the RI simulator as part of the target system description (Figure 8). These criticality tuples are similar
to those described in [23]. We limit ACEs to the possibilities defined in the list of criticality tuples because
they represent the mapping of data to assets and assets
to MEFs. They also define MEF impacts should an
ACE occur in the context of the criticality tuple.
Table 2. Key simulation variables
Variable
Environment to analyze
Run types to execute
Number of trials per run
Number of ACEs per trial

Figure 8. Describing a target system for analysis
Figure 9 defines an ACE, which is an assigned
ACE type (described below), a selected criticality 7tuple, and a scheduled time to occur.

Value Source
Input file or generated
User entry
User entry
User entry

ACE candidates for appli- Drawn from uniform distribucation during a run
tion over input criticality set
Timing of ACE

Drawn from uniform distribution over criticality time range

ACE relative event
probability by ACE type

User entry

ACE detection
probability by C/I/A

User entry

Risk to Asset

See equation (1)

As Figure 8 indicates, a criticality is a 7-tuple entity of the form (MEF, Asset, Data, Begin Time, End
Time, Effect, Impact Score). One can derive such data
from experimentation, simulation [25], or, often, subject matter expert interviews.
The meaning of a tuple instance is that an adverse
cyber event against a given data item processed by the
given cyber asset that supports a given MEF at any
time during over a given time interval will have an impact on the MEF performance indicated by the given
score. Scores range from 0.0 (no effect) to 1.0 (MEF
performance is fully compromised). The effect is either a breach of data confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

Figure 9. Scheduled ACE
ACE types are defined in Table 3. The RI simulator selects and schedules ACEs based on user specifications, as described below. An overview of the algorithm to generate the list of ACEs per the simulation
specification appears in Figure 10. Line 6 of Figure 10
selects an unused criticality tuple based on the ACE
type. For a malicious attack ACE type, the simulator
selects the criticality tuple with the highest computed
risk, as defined in equation (1). As mentioned earlier,
this data is provided as input to the RI simulator and
can be produced by risk methods such as BluGen [23].
Table 3. ACE types
ACE Type

Example Influencing Factors

Malicious Motivation level, stealth concern, asset risk
Attack
(risk to asset owners)
Operator
Error

Operator training, experience,
assignments in the system

Asset
Failure

Asset time in service, mean time between
failure (MTBF)

Acts of
God

Asset geographic location, time of year, climate change

Bugs in
SW/HW

Organizational CMMI level [26]

For ACE types other than malicious attack, the current simulator implementation makes a random selection from among the unused criticalities based on a
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uniform distribution. A future implementation could
use other approaches. For example, for the asset failure ACE type, one might select an unused criticality
tuple whose asset has the highest mean time between
failure (MTBF) based on its asset type.

Figure 10. Algorithm to Generate Initial ACE List

4.2. Sensitivity Analysis
One purpose of the RI simulator is to allow for sensitivity analysis of the computed RI values under various transformations of the system under analysis
and/or active responses taken during a simulation run.
The loop setting up the runs appears in line 2 of Figure
7. To support sensitivity analysis, the simulation applies the ACEs to the target system in a series of runs
or passes specified by the user. The runs facilitate sensitivity analysis with respect to how changes in initial
assumptions affect the overall RI value computed for
each run. The simulator is built to support different
types of runs, as shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Available Run Types
Run Type
Passive
Actively
Respond
Refactor
Change
Risk

Description
A run where no responses to ACEs
are mounted
A run where active response actions
are mounted for detected ACEs (not
all ACEs are detected)
A run where the architecture of the
system is refactored in some way
A run where asset risks are modified
by some percentage (either up or
down) to see the resilience impact for
malicious ACEs

Below, we discuss two run types from Table 4, active responses to ACEs and architectural refactoring.

4.2.1. Active Responses to ACEs
Per line 8 in Figure 7, a run may involve active response to ACEs (the blue squares in Figure 6). There

is a range of potential response actions to ACEs. In the
RI simulator, we chose to initially focus on a key
mechanism discussed in our 2016 paper on resilience
in a space ground system [27]. The mechanism involves having multiple alternative modes of operation.
The primary mode is the default mode and provides
the best mission performance, but is also the most
complex and interconnected. If an ACE within the
components that make up the primary mode is detected and deemed serious enough, the system operator may opt to bring down the primary mode and bring
up a secondary mode of operation that is higher assurance but does not offer the same level of performance.
This multi-mode arrangement provides time to remediate assets tied to the original mode before bringing
the original mode back on-line while still sustaining an
acceptable level of mission performance during remediation. Depending on the system, additional modes
may be justified.

4.2.2. Architectural Refactoring
The simulator has a limited ability to automatically
refactor the architecture of a target environment to assess its impact on the RI score. The simulator is currently built to support the use of redundancy and deception. For the redundancy approach, the simulator
can introduce redundant assets into the architecture for
assets that exceed a user-specified criticality threshold
value for criticality tuples that have an availability effect. The user specifies the number of new assets to
introduce into the architecture and the amount of criticality reduction the simulator should apply to the
original and newly introduced assets. For example,
suppose the user does the following: opts for redundancy refactoring, sets the associated criticality threshold to 0.8, sets the number of new assets to introduce
at 2, and sets the criticality reduction value to 0.2 (a
20% reduction). Then suppose the simulator encounters an asset, a1, with a criticality value of 0.9 for availability. The simulator would introduce two new assets,
a2 and a3, into the architecture and criticality tuple list,
and set the criticality of a1, a2, and a3 to 0.7 for the
availability effect.
For deception, which is only partially implemented
in the instantiation, the idea is to introduce decoys assets into the architecture for assets that have a criticality that exceeds a certain threshold value. Use of decoy
assets can aid in detecting adversary presence. If the
decoy assets can switch back and forth from being decoy assets to redundant assets under a specified (and
unpredictable to the adversary) schedule, then they
may contribute to a criticality reduction for the original assets.
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5. Model and Method Instantiation
The current instantiation of the RI model and simulator method is a Java program with a user interface
that appears in figures below. The simulator uses a
tabbed interface. The first tab (Figure 11) allows the
user to specify the target environment to analyze.

Figure 12. Sim. specification—main tab

Figure 11. Environment tab
The user can load the target environment to be analyzed from a file-based system description formatted
as a structured comma-separated value (CSV) file, or
generate a synthetic environment based on a set of parameters for experimentation purposes.
The next tab, Sim Specification (Figure 12), allows
the user to specify how the simulator is to run. The tab
contains four sub-tabs down the right side: Main,
Events, Refactoring, and Responses. In the main tab,
the user sets the total number of trials to run, the number of ACEs per trial, the effects to simulate (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, or some combination of these effects) during the ACEs, which passes
the simulator is to make to allow comparison of different RI values for the same target system under different system conditions. Finally, the user can specify the
overall length of the trials, and which subinterval the
simulation should choose from within for the span of
simulated ACEs.

Figure 13. Events tab
Figure 13 shows the Events tab, which allows the
user to specify relative probabilities of the five ACE
types and event detection probabilities for breaches of
confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
The refactoring tab (Figure 14) provides an initial
exploration of refactoring possibilities centered
around the introduction of redundant assets and decoy
assets into the architecture, as discussed earlier.
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While we could have custom-edited the starting ACE
list, we opted to accept the generated list.

Figure 15. Generated ACE list

Figure 14. Refactoring tab

The result of running the simulator against this example appears in Figure 16. As shown, the Resilience
Index of the exemplar system is only 19%.

The Responses tab (not shown) allows the user to
indicate whether to use mode switching as an ACE response mechanism, as discussed earlier.

6. Example
We tested the initial simulator instantiation against
a ground system that controls a geosynchronous satellite and its optical sensing payload (this example was
briefly referenced in Figure 2). For sensitivity reasons,
the system is an exemplar only, but experienced
ground segment engineers designed the exemplar system to be realistic, similar to actual deployed ground
systems. The higher-level mission is space situational
awareness. In support of this mission, the system has
two primary MEFs, as shown in Figure 2, and has 39
assets that support the MEFs. The assets, in turn, collectively process 26 data types, and there are 1,010 distinct criticality tuples that specify the mission criticality of different combinations of MEF, asset, data,
times, and compromise effects.
We ran 1,000 trials with 10 ACEs per trial over a
total timeline of 100 time increments. We considered
a single time increment to be one day. For simulator
runs, we chose only the passive case, where ACEs occur, but no active response is mounted. The ACEs generated appear in Figure 15. As shown, 9 out of 10
ACEs are malicious attacks, with one reliability failure
on the storage server asset. This particular mix of
ACEs resulted from ACE type probabilities that we
specified of Malicious=0.70, reliability=0.04,
bugs=0.10, operator error=0.07, and acts of God=0.09.

Figure 16. RI Simulator results summary
The low RI value represents an initial case before
architectural refactoring, improved mitigations (resulting in lower exposure scores), and active response
are done. Such activities could raise the RI value, but
not all of these features are part of the instantiation yet.
A portion of the simulator log showing the final
trial appears in Figure 17. In the trial, three ACEs (#’s
4, 5, and 6) had impact scores for the “Provide Observations” MEF that exceeded the allowable threshold
of 0.8, resulting in the failure of that particular trial.
The simulator took 5 minutes and 49 seconds to run on
a Windows 10 desktop computer with an Intel I7 processor and 16GB of memory. Note that at this stage we
have not attempted any kind of performance optimizations on the simulator instantiation.

Figure 17. Final section of simulator log
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7. Discussion and Evaluation
Revisiting the RI simulator through the lens of Design Science Research (DSR), and the Peffers et al.
DSR model [24] in particular, we have (1) motivated
the need for cyber resilience given the challenges of
making complex, interconnected cyber systems fully
secure, (2) defined a concept for resilience quantification that manifests as an effects-based discrete event
stochastic simulation, (3) demonstrated an instantiation of the simulation against a realistic cyber system,
(4) conducted a preliminary assessment of the model,
method, and instantiation artifacts, and (5) communicated initial results through this paper.
There are a number of limitations related to this initial work: (1) We speculate that simulated malicious
ACE results and attacker behavior converge over the
long run, but more data is required to evaluate this
idea; (2) the simulator uses a simplified model of a target cyber system, not taking, for example, component
connectivity into account; (3) The simulator does not
currently offer a full array of automated refactoring
and ACE response options, including game-theoretic
interactions, that would allow the user to more fully
explore the resilience “tradespace”; (4) The simulator
depends on the user to specify certain values for certain variables used by the simulator, such as ACE type
and detection probabilities. While specifying such
probabilities allows for values that may vary by system context, providing empirically-based initial default values could be of value; (5) Validation exploration of the RI simulator has not yet been undertaken.

8. Conclusions and Future Work
Through its connection to MEFs, the RI simulator
described in this paper provides, we argue, an organizationally relevant quantification of cyber resilience,
addressing the quantification gap mentioned earlier.
The simulator represents an initial foundation for future work in resilience exploration.
A number of future work possibilities exist: (1) improve the modularity of the design to allow new refactoring and response options to be plugged into the simulator and automatically explored if specified by the
user; (2) incorporate time-to-recover to model the recovery of assets taken offline; (3) automatically explore combinations of refactoring and response actions
to identify the highest RI scoring possibilities; (4) incorporate other tradespace priorities into the sensitivity analysis for various options, such as costing constraints; (5) calibrate simulator defaults with the results of empirical experiments (e.g., the degree to
which using quantified risk estimates to prioritize ma-

licious ACE targeting is reflected in attacker behavior); (6) enhance metadata about target architectures
with data that informs ACE default probabilities (e.g.,
asset type-specific mean time between failures for reliability-related ACEs, training data to inform operator
error ACEs.); (7) carry out evaluations of artifact utility with an appropriate target audience, and (8) incorporate simulated human decision making in mounting
certain responses; (9) as data becomes available, revisit the use of uniform distributions in the simulator;
in the meantime, explore the potential use of other distributions and their impact; (10) consider other effects
in the simulator, such as confidentiality, non-repudiation, and authentication choices; (11) give further
thought to approaches for validating RI simulator results, such as by calibrating the RI simulator variables
and the ACE list generation approach based on data
gathered from long-term observational studies of
cyber systems operating in a realistic threat environment; (12) give consideration for how to model the effects of simultaneous ACEs; (13) explore the idea of
introducing into the specification a minimum downtime for an ACE before the effect of the ACE is registered (that is, rapid recovery from an ACE might negate the MEF impacts); (14) explore expanding the
simulator to incorporate into resilience the idea of
maintaining not just threshold level MEF performance
but performance that sustainably approaches or meets
objective MEF performance.
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